towards the origin-country governments. The government of Albania also recognised these differences and used them in its policy towards the diaspora. Thus, during the communist years, the pre-war emigrants were considered as labour migrants and were accorded recognition along with some benefits such as freer communication with their families in Albania, return visits and so on. Some were even allowed to return to Albania upon retirement, provided their official story about life abroad was one of suffering and exploitation as manual labourers working for merciless capitalists. Such returns benefited the country's coffers as the returnees brought much-needed dollars with them, or received regular pensions from abroad.
In contrast to this group, those who had fled during the communist years -whether for fear of political and religious persecution or because of personal vendettas and blood feuds -were regarded by the state as traitors, often condemned as spies working for intelligence agencies of governments that wanted to overthrow Albania's communist rulers. Article 14 of the 1946 citizenship law specifically referred to these individuals when stipulating cases in which removal of Albanian citizenship could be enacted. These migrants in turn, also built a strong anti-communist resistance, which was especially politically and financially powerful in the USA (Nazi, 2000, p.150; Ragaru, 2002) .
Although no studies have focused specifically on the role of diaspora in the fall of communism in Albania, some commentators suggest that this role was quite important in the crucial years of [1989] [1990] [1991] . During this time diaspora money, skills and information helped the first opposition party campaign more effectively during the first multi-party elections, and then eventually retain it in power for some years to come (Vickers, 1995) .
The current situation
The rupture that 45 years of communist rule brought to the emigration history and tradition of Albania came to an end in 1990. The movement that subsequently took place was one of the most significant modern global migrations, both in terms of its share of population and typologies.
As communism collapsed, Albania's borders fell with it. Many will remember the old ships impossibly loaded with people sailing from Albania's coast to southern Italy in the spring and summer of 1991; they became the symbol of the so-called global migration crisis (see the cover of Weiner, 1995) . Many more walked in droves across the country and over the mountains to reach Greece. Most of these migrations were irregular and of a to-and-fro nature, and thus very difficult to quantify. Table 1 provides a snapshot of numbers and destination countries compiled from data made available by the Albanian Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (MOLSAEO) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI), at three key moments of the past two decades. GoA (2005b, p.36); 2010 : NID (2010 The table speaks for itself, but I highlight a few important features here. First, connecting this picture to the historical migration we saw earlier, it is clear that geography matters.
Both then and now, the earliest settlements and the most important destinations for migrants have been Greece and Italy in that order. It is interesting at this point to consider the relations between the historical and the new diaspora, especially since a break of some centuries exists between the two. A few studies which have looked at this topic have found how the new arrivals have been treated as 'others' by the settled Arbëresh and Arvanites. These two communities have tended to emphasise their roots, but identify more with local belonging (Italian and Greek respectively), at the same time adopting local society's imagery and stereotypes of the new Albanian migrants (for Italy see Derhemi, 2003; and for Greece, Magliveras, 2009 ).
The second point is that although both of these countries remain important, the USA and the UK have been gaining ground, especially in the second post-communist decade. 6 The historical diaspora in the USA is boosted by new arrivals, while that in the UK has developed from almost zero, so to speak, having had practically no previous own ethnic community to rely on.
The third remark concerns the total volume of migrants, which by 2005 represents a third of the country's total resident population. Indeed, we see a progressive increase in numbers of emigrants which almost double between 1999 and 2010, even if we consider a more conservative total for 2010. For example, the corresponding figure from the World Bank data is 1.44 million, equivalent to almost half (45.4 per cent) of Albania's resident population of 3.2 million (World Bank, 2011, p.54) . Results of the 2011 census suggest a continuation of this trend, noting an 8 per cent population decrease in the [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] inter-censal period, due primarily to emigration (INSTAT, 2012) .
Besides these variations in destination places, post-1990 migrations also display a strong regional character in terms of migrants' areas of origin (refer back to Figure 1 ).
Once again, geography is very important here. The areas to the west of the country, especially along the Adriatic coast, have been the primary source regions for migrations to Italy. Migrants to Greece come from all over Albania, but there is a clear dominance of those who lived in the south and south-east of the country, bordering Greece (King, 2005) . In fact, some migratory flows have taken on a rather regional character, reestablishing transnational ties which had existed before the Cold War. One example is the transnational space created between the area of Korçë, south-east Albania, and that of Greater Thessaloniki, in Northern Greece (Hatziprokopiou, 2006; Vullnetari, 2012) .
Similarly, historical ties have been important particularly in the case of migration to the USA, most of which originated then (late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) and now (post-1990) in southern Albania. Migrations spurred by historical ties have also facilitated recent moves from southern Albania to Australia and Canada.
An additional, but important, factor in the flows to the USA and Canada has been these governments' immigration policies. For instance, between 1990 and 2011 a stock of over 80,000 Albania-born migrants had obtained legal permanent residence in the US. 7 The majority of them had entered through the annual Diversity Visa Lottery. 8 In the case of Canada, the most important drive has been the Federal Skilled Worker programme, which has attracted flows of highly skilled in particular. Finally, the importance of policy in acting as a channelling force for migrant flows can be seen also in settlements of Albanians to a few other West European countries, where no prior significant diaspora or historical links existed. Two examples here. The first is the bi-lateral labour agreement with Germany signed in 1991, according to which 1000 Albanians went there to work and train for a year; none of them returned and the agreement was not renewed (GoA, 2005b) . The second example comes from the 'embassy migrants' of 1990 who became the nuclei for further chain migration in the years to come. 9 Coming back to our geography of origin, it is worth noting that the vast majority of those who settled in the UK originate from the north and north-east of Albania. These were also the areas that received the first and overwhelming share of refugees from neighbouring Kosovo during the 1998-2000 war there. As Kosovars used Albania to transit to other asylum destination countries, many Albanians from this area (and some from other parts of the country), mixed themselves in with them (Barjaba and King, 2005) . The Albanian diaspora in the UK, is therefore quite heterogeneous, including migrants from all Albanian-inhabited areas in the Balkans (Kostovicova and Prestreshi, 2003) .
Institutions and Policies
By the end of the 1990s a joke ran in the local dailies in Albania which went like this:
when the minister of labour affairs was asked how he planned to resolve the unemployment crisis in the country, he had replied that the motor boats in Vlorë (used to smuggle migrants across the Adriatic to Italy) were working to full capacity (de Waal, 2005) . The joke illustrates the lack of migration policies, or at least of their effectiveness, during the 1990s.
Policymaking on migration in Albania in the last decade has been framed within the wider discourse of EU membership, thus highly influenced by EU bodies (see Dedja 2012 ). In addition, host-country governments, especially those of Italy and Greece, have played a key role in 'managing' Albanian migration. Some of this influence has been channelled through their development agencies which are an essential part of the socalled 'donor community' in the country, and powerful influencers of inter-governmental organisations such as the IOM.
Institutional framework
At a national level, the key governmental institutions related to migration and diaspora 
National Institute for Diaspora
The NID was established in January 1996 as an entity under the Prime Minister's office, but moved to the MoFA in September of that year. While its activity was quite obscure well until the 2000s, it received a boost when it was specifically included in the National Strategy on Migration. In fact, this proposed the creation of a Migration Agency attached to the Prime Minister's Office, which would be a body to coordinate action amongst the various relevant ministries and other institutions (such as INSTAT). It would have financial autonomy and extensive policymaking powers in the field of migration and diaspora (GoA 2005b, p.88 ). However, this did not materialise and the NID was reinstated in its place.
The NID was given a special place in the NSM where it was tasked with (GoA, 2005b, pp.36-7) : § mapping the Albanian diaspora abroad, including university students; § compiling a geographical and demographic atlas of this diaspora; § promoting contacts and relations between diaspora members and Albania; § promoting the image of Albania abroad, as well as drawing investment in Albania from the diaspora.
The main activities of the institute so far have been of a rather artistic and cultural character, and seem to have focus overwhelmingly on the historical diaspora. First, there are the visits around the world to meet Albanian individuals and organisations, from Arbëresh in Italy and Arvanites in Greece to historical communities in Croatia, Ukraine and the USA. Second, the institute has also received visits from representatives of Albanian migrant and diaspora organisations, as well as Albanian celebrities living abroad. Third, it has organised, or supported the organisation of, various cultural and artistic events such as concerts, exhibitions, book promotions, television programmes about migrant communities and the diaspora. Fourth, it has distributed symbolic materials to diaspora organisations such as flags, souvenirs and leaflets with information to promote Albania as a business and tourist destination. Fifth, it has organised or supported efforts for the teaching of Albanian language to migrant children abroad. This was also one of the key tasks of the institute according to the NSM. As mentioned earlier, the NID facilitated curricula and Albanian language school texts, as well as other books on Albanian culture and folklore. It also supported joint yearly training seminars of Albanian language teachers of the diaspora. Meanwhile, consular staff of relevant Albanian embassies participated in end-of-school year festivities, organised by migrant NGOs for diaspora children who attend supplementary language and culture schools.
A sixth aim of the NID was to set up five cultural centres in Athens, Rome, New York, London and Toronto, which would serve as mobilisation nodes of the large diaspora/migrant communities in the countries with the largest numbers, as well as act as promoter of Albanian's image abroad. Promoting Albania for diaspora investment has been pursued also through the director's visits abroad, and by encouraging visits of diaspora members and their non-Albanian friends to the country. The target was the historical diaspora, especially in the USA, but also that from Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia residing in European countries such as Germany and Switzerland, which are generally considered as possessing established and significant wealth. A different example is Alb-Shkenca, which started as an internet forum and was later formally registered as an Institute with its headquarters in Tirana. This is a truly transnational network with a membership spanning countries and continents and its management residing in Europe and North America. Its membership is based on education levels and skills, regardless of place of residence -a candidate is required to be at least enrolled for a Master's degree -and retained through an annual fee. The network organises annual scientific conferences with presentations of members' work across all science disciplines, rotating amongst Tirana, Pristina (Kosovo), and Tetovo (Macedonia).
In September 2010 its fifth conference was held in Tirana, under the motto: 'Integration of the Diaspora in the Albanian Science, Economy and Culture'. The institute publishes members' works in its Annals, which it has symbolically called 'ANASH' (in Albanian meaning 'aside'). Besides being an abbreviation, the institute explains the title as signifying the neglect of Albanian politicians towards this 'scientific diaspora', which nonetheless is making every effort to be involved in improving the lives of Albanians wherever they might be (Alb-Shkenca, 2009).
health, or irregular status in the host country. Political participation is, nonetheless, considerable from migrants in Greece (although the degree is relative and subject to speculation in the absence of systematic research). It is also here that more intensive political campaigning by candidates takes place. Indeed, branches of the three main political parties -Socialist Party (SP), Democratic Party (DP) and the Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI) -have been created in Greece, and are often used as vehicles for garnering migrants' support during electoral campaigns back home.
The issue of migrant voting has often come up in electoral campaigns in recent years, yet the status quo has been retained. In preparation for the 2009 parliamentary elections, a public debate ensued in Albania the previous year in order to revise the electoral code so as to ensure free and fair elections. Emigrant voting took a prominent place in this debate, not least due to the active role played by G99 -initially a civil movement which developed into a centre-left political party shortly before the elections.
G99's staff consists of professionals in their twenties and thirties, trained in top universities abroad and who have returned to work in Albania. The movement mobilised to garner public support for, and pressure relevant authorities to, include external voting in the revision of the electoral code, proposing a special system of direct postal voting by special courier as the best option for the Albanian context. 15 Although two of the major political parties (SP and LSI) half-promised reform during this intense period of debate, especially during their campagining in Greece, nothing materialised. This was all the more dissapointing given that various political actors and civil society members had previously agreed to amend the electoral code to enable distant voting, as part of the actions stipulated in the NAP on Migration (GoA, 2005a, p.86 , measure 58, activity 3).
Other policies for emigrants with recognised status
While Albanian migrants have been providing a life-line for their households and the country's economy throughout these post-communist years, it was only recently that their key role in the country's development was recognised (see de Zwager et al., 2005) . This acknowledgment was reflected in the first and only National Migration Strategy to date, which specifically linked migration to development. Inagurated in 2006 with much pomp and ceremony, the strategy was followed by a set of Action Plans on Migration and Remittances, the Law on Emigration for Employment Purposes, the launching of the Brain-Gain programme discussed earlier and other pieces of legislation and programmes to combat irregular migration and facilitate return. The latter was particularly singled out for intervention in the hope of attracting migrants' financial capital and skills through taxation and financial incentives. For example, according to article 9 of the 2006 law on emigration for employment purposes, returning migrants are exempt from customs duties and taxes on personal items they bring with them upon return, as well as a limited number of work tools. However, in order to benefit from this provision, they must have acquired the status of 'emigrant' and that of 'returnee'. Both of these are obtained by registering in the relevant register held at local employment offices which report to MOLSAEO, and amending their records at this register upon return. Another example is the provision of tax breaks promised by the government in its political programme in 2005. In February 2006 a draft law was proposed according to which returnees who started businesses in Albania could claim tax exemption for the first three to five years (Chaloff, 2008) . Furthermore, the campaign included the much-publicised 'Albania: €1' which offered emigrants, the diaspora and foreigners land for only €1, in order to boost investment in poor areas with high unemployment rates (Sulka, 2006) . Both initiatives were either watered down or followed by requirements that made them inaccessible for most emigrants; the last of the two in particular because of the sheer threshold of capital investment required -in the millions of euros. As other specialists have observed, having progressive legislation is not enough if adequate implementation does not follow (Ikonomi, 2009 ). The presence of these large Albanian minorities in the near abroad has been a challenge to various Albanian governments and certainly an important influencing factor in the country's foreign policy. Overall it can be said that kin-minority policy takes the form of a 'national responsibility' as reflected in the constitution of Albania. 16 The complex way in which kin-state minority policies are interwoven with emigration policies are not always without contradictions. For example, the NID whose task has been to handle matters of the diaspora on behalf of the Albanian state, has worked closely with the Ministries of Education both in Albania and Kosovo in order to prepare 'harmonised' textbooks and curricula for teaching the Albanian language and culture in the diaspora (Greca, 2008) . In the same framework joint language and training conferences for teachers of Albanian in the diaspora are organised each year. Indeed, the NID has used a broad definition of 'Albanian diaspora' in its discourse, to include historical communities as well as the more recent migrants, emphasising identity as Albanians rather than of Albania (see the various Information Bulletins of the NID). This is in contrast to NSM's statement that the state's '[migration] policy on Albanian communities abroad is intended to include migrants of Albanian nationality in host countries and not minorities in the neighbouring countries... ' (GoA, 2005b, p.37) .
Regional diaspora and kin-state policies
Interesting to note that recent debates among Albanian state and non-state actors in the region seem to display a similar approach to diaspora, as explained next.
Debates on the Role of Emigrants
Throughout the two post-communist decades the focus of the public discourse has understandably been on contemporary migrants. The intensity of migration has meant that most Albanians have either emigrated themselves or have been closely involved in migration networks through their relatives and friends, thus being personally concerned about migrants' welfare and their struggles at home and abroad. In addition, since the mid-2000s there has been increased public awareness and debate related to migrants' socio-economic impact on Albania itself. The focus has been squarely on remittances, which increased year-on-year from a baseline of $150 million in 1992 reaching their peak at $1.3 billion in 2007. In the early 1990s remittances covered almost the entire trade deficit and constituted as much as 22% of the country's GDP (Vullnetari, 2012) . Following Orozco's (2003, p. 3) five T's, besides remittances Albanian migrants are contributors also through their large-scale participation in Tourism, especially during the summer months and in particular those who reside in Greece, Italy and the UK; Transportation, as they travel between host and origin countries during visits and holidays; Telecommunication, as family members separated across countries retain links through phone calls and the internet; and less so in terms of nostalgic Trade related to ethnic foodstuff imports.
Following the decline of financial remittances since 2008 it appears that the chance to utilise their developmental potential may have been lost. Some have turned their attention to migrants' social and political contribution instead. Emerging from younger political elites, themselves returnees with high-flying professional careers, such initiatives result from combined public good and personal agendas. Elite migrants such as students and professionals are co-opted into existing political structures 'at home', giving renewed energy to tired agendas and a lease of life to older figures, while also deflecting any overarching image of the diaspora as a potential arena for dissent. In turn, returnees benefit from career opportunities perhaps not available to them elsewhere. Others opt for autonomous initiatives yet within overall existing frameworks. It is within such interpretation that I see both the 'external voting' debate discussed earlier and the 'integrated diaspora' that I come to next. The former was aimed to directly engage everyday migrants in the political process by asking them to cast their vote during elections, as well as lobby for migrants' representatives in parliament, thus effectuating their position as Albania's 'shareholders' deserving to part-take in power (Totozani, 2008 ).
The latter concept of an integrated diaspora is developed within a discourse that seeks to integrate all Albanian-inhabited areas in the Balkans into what is labelled as an Albanian space or 'Albanosphere'. 17 The diaspora is seen as a platform that can facilitate such integration considering its self-identification abroad as 'belonging to the Albanian ethno-cultural nation, which encompasses persons with different citizenships living in different states' (Pichler, 2009: 215) . A vision for joint structures and institutions amongst the different states recognises the need to move the debate from the management of migratory flows to the management of diaspora's capitals -financial, human and socio-cultural. While diaspora's developmental potential is recognised, with the new elite succeed where the old one failed?
Conclusion
This chapter has mapped and discussed the Albanian diaspora, by focusing on the role of the state and its political elite in promoting and instrumentalising the country's global diaspora. One of the key conclusions is that Albanian diaspora is very diverse in terms of its historical background, its geographical roots, and not least its involvement with Albania itself. This heterogeneity is in turn recognised and instrumentalised by Albanian governments to serve political goals. For example, the anti-communist layer of diaspora was demonised as anti-national by the communist rulers. Yet, it was soon considered as a platform of dissent and financial muscle by those who ascended to power once the regime fell. Moreover, the Albanian diaspora is also an ethno-cultural one, relating more to this ethnicity than its origin state. This makes the concept of an integrated diaspora, as a platform shared amongst these states, even more feasible. (Bartl, 2011; Hall, 1994, p.50; Tirta, 1999, p.141) . For an in-depth study of one of these 'Albanian' towns, Piana degli Albanesi in Sicily, see 
